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The purpose of this thesis is to understand the relationship of trade secrecy and covenants not 
to compete. To accomplish this task a  differences-in-differences analysis was conducted on a 
sample of 659,945 U.S. patents generated by U.S. public companies. Empirical findings 
highlight that the use of both trade secrecy and covenants not to compete has a positive 
impact on the expected value and variance of the invention value distribution. 
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Introduction 
 
“Don’t let your employees do to you what you did to your former boss!” – Roger 
Borovoy, Counsel in the Silicon Valley office of Fish & Richardson P.C. 
Innovation is a crucial aspect of business in knowledge intensive industries. It may 
topple market leaders and transform the industry completely. Any firm needs to pursue 
new knowledge and protect it in order to appropriate the returns successfully (Agarwal 
et al. 2009, Shaver and Flyer 2000). 
However, knowledge may not be easy to protect due to its tacit nature. Tacit knowledge 
is inserted in the human capital of researchers and inventors. As such, the only way to 
protect this knowledge is by binding their employees with legal tools such as trade 
secrecy or covenants not to compete. 
Statistics show us that these types of protections are in fact increasingly used by 
companies. Trade Secret (hereafter TS) litigation doubled from 1988 to 1995 and 
doubled again from 1995 to 2004 (Almeling et. al 2010). As for covenants not to 
compete (hereafter CNC), nowadays virtually 70% of start-ups receiving venture capital 
funds are required to sign a CNC (Kaplan and Stromberg 2003), whereas, in the IT 
industry, 80% of its new employees sign a non-compete contracts (Holley 1998). 
The effect of TS and CNC is strongly debated among scholars and policy-makers. On 
one hand, TS and CNC limit knowledge diffusion, which is crucial for innovation and 
economic growth (Snowdon& Vane 2005). On the other hand, they create incentive to 
innovate, by granting to the innovator a: a sort of “monopoly” over the new knowledge 
(Samila and Sorenson 2011, Franco & Mitchel 2008).  
Previous research has generally treated TS and CNC as substitute, due to the similarity 
of their purpose. Thus, we still lack an understanding of how the protection granted by 
TS and CNC interact with each other. The goal of this study is precisely to investigate 
this interaction between these two legal tools, in order to ascertain their joint impact on 
the invention value distribution. In particular, I hypothesize that TS and CNC are 
complements, inducing firms to undertake risky but more valuable R&D paths. 
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In order to verify this hypothesis, I applied a difference-in-difference analysis using data 
collected from NBER database from 1976 to 2006. Specifically I relied on the number 
of forward citations as a measure of invention value (Albert et al, 1991 Trajtenber 1990, 
Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg 2005, Gambardella et al., 2008). Moreover, I took 
advantage of both Png’s (2011) Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA) enactment 
chronology and Garmaise’s (2009) non-compete Enforceability Index as measures of 
application and strength of those legal tools. 
Results show that the joint enforceability of TS and CNC leads companies to pursue 
more daring and valuable inventions. The evidence of a complementary relation 
between these legal tools not only fills a gap in the academic literature it draws 
important conclusions for policy maker and business management.  
The structure of this thesis is as follows. Firstly, I make a brief literature review 
encompassing all relevant research for my analysis. Then I illustrate the empirical 
approach and the results obtained. I conclude discussing the results, and describing the 
contributions and limitations of this work.  
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Literature Review 
 
To effectively become and remain competitive, firms should pursue new knowledge, 
capture its value and protect it (Agarwal et al. 2009, Shaver and Flyer 2000). Indeed, 
limiting leakages in R&D intensive companies is crucial for retaining a competitive 
advantage over competitors (Ceccagnoli 2009). 
However the protection of knowledge might be difficult. Knowledge is the 
accumulation of information through experience, communication or inference (Zack 
1999), and can be explicit or tacit. Both types of knowledge are abstract, but the 
easiness to transfer them is what that makes them different. The former can be codified 
through books, computer code or formulas. The latter, can instead only be transferred 
through conversation, story-telling and shared experience. 
The difficulty to articulate tacit knowledge makes its protection more difficult. Patents 
are usually useless regarding tacit knowledge, which leads managers to use other type of 
legal means. Even so knowledge could slip out of their control. Thus the question of 
how to appropriate the returns of tacit knowledge remains. The answer lies in the 
vehicle of knowledge transfer, their employees. ‘The best way to send information is to 
wrap it up in a person - J. Robert Oppenheimer’ (quoted in Stephan 2006) 
To counter this threat, companies seek out to protect themselves in other ways to 
successfully appropriate their returns on their R&D investment. Indeed Cohen et al. 
(2000) shows that there is a preference of using other means for capturing value from 
innovation, such as lead time, complementary assets and most importantly secrecy.   
Trade Secrecy law dates back to the nineteenth century when capitalism start evolving 
with the industrial age. The Peabody v. Norfolk case, in 1860, enabled the 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court to crystallize the law of trade secrets in the 
United States (Bone 1998). In 1939 in the Restatement (First) of Torts trade secret law 
was defined as “any formula, pattern, device or compilation of information which is 
used in one's business, and which gives him an opportunity to obtain an advantage over 
competitors who do not know or use it". However, only in 1979 with the National 
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform States Law the Uniform Trade Secrets Act 
  
5 
 
(UTSA) was created a reference regulation for all US states, even if the timing of 
adoption was different across states.. 
Trade Secrecy is one of the most important tools to appropriate returns of innovation, 
especially, technical innovation (Arundel and Kabla 1998; Arundel 2001). Its main 
advantage, relatively to patents, is its broader protection: knowledge does not need to be 
novel in order to be protected and it is protected by TS as long as companies find it 
useful. Companies, such as Coca-Cola, Google or Intel, use trade secrecy and it is part 
of what enables them to sustain their competitive advantage. 
One of the most important cases is the one of Intel against Broadcom. In March 2000, 
Broadcom and four ex-employees were sued by Intel for misappropriation of trade 
secrets. According to Intel those ex-employees would “inevitably disclose” Intel’s trade 
secrets. Additionally, Intel asked for an injunction that forbidden its ex-employees 
working for their competitors. Of the four ex-employees one was indeed barred from 
working for Broadcom. 
Similarly, covenants not to compete are also aimed to impede the transfer of knowledge. 
A CNC contract states that if an employee leaves their current job, he cannot work for 
competing firms, including newly formed companies. One could say that a CNC is sort 
of a signed confession of the ‘inevitability of disclosure’ of trade secrets by the 
employee. The CNC contract enforcement may be limited in time or even geography 
pending on court’s decision. 
CNC date back to the time of crafting Guilds. At that time, there was no need to do 
formalized CNC, since they were an inherent part of any master and apprentice relation. 
It was only in the eighteenth century in England with the Mitchel v. Reynold case (Fisk 
1999) that formal rules were established. 
This logic on CNC’s spread also to the United States which accepted the enforceability 
of CNC’s. However the regulation of CNC, contrary to trade secrets, varies from state 
to state, as there is no uniform Act regulating non-compete contracts
1
. CNC’s are 
commonly used in many states. According to Kaplan and Stromberg (2003), about 70% 
of entrepreneurs receiving venture capital funds are required to sign a covenant not to 
                                                 
1
Trade secrecy law can also rely on common law. In fact there are four states who still abide to the 
Restatement of Torts and use still common law to rule trade secrecy cases ( Massachusetts; New York, 
New Jersey, Texas and North Carolina) 
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compete. At the same time, almost 80% of new IT professionals are required to sign a 
CNC contract (Holley 1998). 
Both TS and CNC’s are extensively used by companies to appropriate the returns of 
their R&D investments, though at the expense of their employees’ mobility.  This 
tradeoff between knowledge protection and diffusion is widely debated. On the one 
hand, they limit employee mobility and knowledge diffusion, and eventually hamper 
innovation, as also pointed out by the endogenous growth theories (Snowdon & Vane 
2005 pg. 626). Gilson (1999) and Hyde (2001) argue that the statute in California 
(California Business and Professions Code, Section 16600), which prohibits CNC’s, 
determined the rising of Silicon Valley as the best technology cluster in the United 
States, at the expense of  Route’128 in Massachusetts ,which instead enforced CNC’s. 
Along similar lines, Graves and Diboise (2006) argue that the ‘inevitable disclosure’ 
theory poses a great threat to innovation due to its overbroad restriction. Employers 
have in many cases malicious intent, in that they only aim at blocking their former 
employee. Hence, they use and “swamp” accusations of misappropriation of secrecy 
even when they are not true. Due to the misuse of TS, employee mobility and (legal) 
knowledge spillovers, which are fundamental to innovation, are hampered. 
On the other hand, both CNC’s and TS may instead foster innovation. Franco & Mitchel 
(2008) discuss the importance of CNC enforceability in a new industry in order to 
incentive and stimulate new ideas, entrepreneurship and ultimately innovation. On top 
of that, CNC’s do not block innovation but instead give firms the incentive to pursue 
risky but potentially path-breaking R&D projects. In this sense, they create a trade-off 
between entrepreneurship and intrapreneurship (Conti, forthcoming):  with higher CNC 
enforceability, companies are more inclined to take riskier R&D projects, which more 
likely lead to a path-breaking discovery. Moreover, Png (2012) shows that the TS do 
not limit inventor mobility in high-tech companies, which puts into question the 
detrimental effect of trade secret law on knowledge spillovers and thus innovation. 
Previous studies have generally considered TS and NC as substitutes, in the sense that 
both of them help companies protect their knowledge, impeding employees to bring 
valuable information to other employers. However, one might instead argue that TS and 
CNC’s are quite different. First, TS ensure a protection ex post, whereas CNC provide 
with a protection ex ante. That is, TS limit the knowledge leakages only once 
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employees have left the company. Instead, CNC directly prevent the employees from 
moving to a competitor. Second, TS impede the transfer of knowledge regardless 
whether the new employer is a direct competitor or not. By contrast, CNC prevent 
knowledge leakages only to direct rivals. Hence, TS and CNC might ensure a more 
effective protection only when they are used together. The purpose of this study falls 
exactly into this question: are CNC’s and TS complements, in that the protection 
granted by one legal tool is enhanced by the concurrent use of the other, or substitutes, 
in that they essentially play the same role? 
In order to seek out the answer to my research question, I analyze the interaction 
between CNC and TS on both the expected value and the variance of the invention 
value. With respect to Png (2012), this work differs in two dimensions. First, I am 
explicitly interested in the joint impact of TS and CNC, rather than in their separate 
effect. Second, I consider the impact on firm R&D outcome, rather than on employee 
mobility. I expect that firms operating in states where both TS and CNC are enforceable 
are in fact provided with a broader knowledge protection with respect to firms in states 
where just one of these legal means is enforceable. As a result, I hypothesize that TS 
and CNC complement each other, and they jointly induce companies to pursue more 
daring R&D paths which in turn lead to more valuable outcomes (Conti, forthcoming).  
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Methods 
Sample and data 
 
To investigate the impact of CNC and TS on invention value, I used the latest National 
Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) patent database. This database provides 
information about all patents applied and granted in US between 1976 and 2006, 
including the citations they have received over time, which is crucial for the present 
empirical analysis.  
The choice to restrict the analysis just to patents applied for by US public companies 
was to facilitate the assignation of patent to an organization unequivocally. The 
concordance file provided by Bessen (2009) enabled the connection between the 
assignee identification number of the NBER patent dataset and the GVKEY 
identification number of Compustat database, which contains information exclusively 
on companies traded in the US stock market. Then with the GVKEY identification 
code, all patents owned by a company’s subsidiaries were univocally assigned to the 
parent firm. Furthermore, in order to keep the sample sound, I only considered the 
perfect matches between the NBER and Compustat databases. I also dropped any 
observation that had negative R&D expenditure. 
Following Png (2011), which I used as a source of UTSA adoption in US, I chose 1976-
2006 for the period of analysis. The UTSA was first enacted with effect from 1981, 
therefore I start the analysis five years before the first elective date of the UTSA. As for 
the reasoning behind the last year covered by the analysis, it is because it is the last year 
covered by the NBER Patent Database. 
This period, however, might raise a problem due to the fact that the Garmaise (2009) 
index about CNC enforceability covers only the time period between 1992 and 2004. 
However, according to Samila and Sorenson (2011), no critical changes were registered 
in the last thirty years, with exception of four states. Within these four states only two, 
Michigan in 1985 and Oregon in 2008, are not covered in the time period. From those 
two, I was able to include Michigan change, as it will be explained later. 
Totally I gathered 659,945US patents applied and granted to public companies during 
1976-2006. 
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Measures 
 
After providing the characteristics of the sample used in the analysis, this section will 
provide the information about the variables constructed to execute the analysis of the 
relationship between covenants not to compete and trade secrecy regarding the 
invention value. For an easier comprehension, Table 1 sums up all the variables used in 
the empirical analysis. 
Table 1. Measure 
Variables Definition 
Invention Value 
Number of  forward citations received 
by a patent 
Source: NBER patent database 
TS 
Dummy variable that takes the value of 
1 if the state in which the patent was 
applied has enacted the UTSA in that 
year. 
Source: Non-competition Enforcement Index 
(Png, 2011) 
CNC 
Degree of enforceability of non-
competes ranging from 0 to 9 
Source: Non-competition Enforcement Index 
(Garmaise, 2009) 
TSxCNC  Interaction variable of TS and GCNC 
R&D Expenditure 
 Research & Development expenditure 
of the firm that holds the patent (MM$) 
Source: NBER Database 
Employees 
 Number of employees of the firm that 
holds the patent (M) 
Source: NBER Database Source: NBER Database 
Year Dummies 
Dummy variable coded as 1 for each 
year of the sample period 1976-2006 
State Dummies 
Dummy variable coded as 1 for each 
state of the U.S. 
 
Dependent Variable 
 
Invention Value 
In order to assess the impact on the firm invention value I used the number of forward 
citations received by a patent. The number of citations is highly correlated with many 
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measures of economic or technological value, including the contribution to an 
organization’s value (Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg, 2005), inventors’ assessments of 
economic value (Gambardella et al.,2008), expert evaluations of patent value (Albert et 
al, 1991), patent renewal rates (Harhoff et al.,1999) and consumer surplus generated 
(Trajtenberg, 1990). 
Independent Variables 
 
Trade Secrecy (TS) 
To assess the impact of trade secrecy regulation, following Png (2011), I coded the 
variable TS to be equal to 1 if the state of the firm’s headquarters in that given year has 
already enacted the UTSA, and zero otherwise. The UTSA established a comprehensive 
statute for all states without significant case law (Png 2011), and also expanded the 
definition of a trade secret (Lydon 1987, Samuel and Johnson 1990). 
According to Png (2011) the timing of adherence to the UTSA is completely unrelated 
to anything besides the legislation agenda which is consistent with prior research by 
Ribstein and Kobayashi 1996.  Therefore it is possible to conclude that the time of 
enactment of UTSA is truly exogenous. 
Garmaise Non- Competion Enforcement Index (GCNC) 
In order to measure the enforceability of covenants not to compete across the states of 
U.S., I used the Non-Competition Enforcement Index elaborated by Garmaise (2009). 
The enforceability index consists on a factor score considering the effects of changes in 
state regulations over time and cross-sectional differences in state laws based on the 12 
questions formulated by Malsberger (2004). These questions had the objective of 
assessing the different aspects of covenants not compete legislation across the fifty 
states of U.S. and D.C. The factor score was done by assigning one point to each 
question if the state’s CNC enforcement exceeded a given threshold, hence, the index 
range of zero to twelve. 
Garmaise (2009) Index starts only in 1992. Yet, according to Samila and Sorenson 
(2011) no major changes took place on the enforcement of covenants to compete in the 
last thirty years, except four cases. Two of them (Florida in 1996 and Texas in 1994) are 
already included in Garmaise (2009) index. The other two are Michigan in 1985 and 
  
11 
 
Oregon in 2008. According to Marx et al (2007), Michigan, in 1905, passed the statute 
445.761 which has a great similarity to the California section 16600, “All agreements 
and contracts by which any person…agrees not to engage in any avocation or 
employment…are hereby declared to be against public policy and illegal and void.”, 
meaning it explicitly prohibited any form of covenants not to compete. The law changed 
again only in 1985 due to the Michigan Antitrust Reform Act, which repealed the 
prohibition. Hence, I assumed that the enforcement degree of Michigan before 1985 was 
zero, as in California. 
All the changes in the state legislature regarding CNC can be considered exogenous. 
The first change in Michigan in 1985 was due to an antitrust reform secondary effect. 
Similarly is Texas which changed its legislation due to a Texas Supreme Court. It is 
likely that companies in both cases were not aware of the inbound change in the 
enforcement. More dubious is the change in Florida enforcement which was caused by a 
direct change in state legislation, so companies would most likely be aware of the 
impending change and adapt their R&D practices. 
 
Trade Secrecy*Covenants Not to Compete 
To assess the relationship of Trade Secrecy and Covenants Not to compete, I made an 
interaction variable with the enforcement index and the trade secrecy variables. This 
variable is crucial to answer the research question of this study. 
Control Variables 
In order to reduce the risk of over or underestimation some control variables were 
introduced in the analysis: R&D expenditure and number of employees. The first one, 
R&D expenditure has the intention of controlling the effect the total investment in R&D 
might have in the number of citations, as well as the second, the number of employees, 
since big companies tend to have more patents and consequently might have more 
forward citations. 
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Empirical Strategy 
 
To analyze the relationship between trade secrecy and covenants not to compete, I used 
a differences-in-differences technique. The various states enacted the UTSA and made 
changes to the enforceability of CNCs with effect in different years. Hence, I used the 
procedure of Acharya et al. (2010) using panel estimation to implement a differences in 
differences in a setting of multiple treatment groups over multiple years. Specifically, I 
estimated the following model through OLS: 
                                                     
In the equation,       represents the number of forward citations and     is the 
idiosyncratic error for company i in state s in year t. Further,     =1 for any year t in 
which the UTSA was effective in state s and zero otherwise;       is the enforceability 
level of a state s in a given year i. Finally            represents the interaction of 
both described variables.          are the firm, time and state fixed effects. 
 
Still, a problem that might arise from using the difference-in-differences estimation is 
the inconsistency in standard errors that can result from serial correlations among 
observations and that may be extremely high if the analysis includes several periods of 
time. This issue may lead to false statistical significance in the treatment. Hence, I 
clustered the errors to the state level following the strategy of Bertrand et al. (2004). 
I have specified all absolute variables, R&D expenditure, number of employees and 
forward citations as logarithms; and relative measures, CNC and TS, in their native 
form.  
As robustness checks I first shorten the period of analysis from 1990 to 2006, to not 
only shorten the number of observations but also to focus mainly on the period of that 
changes occurred in the CNC enforceability to confirm the relation between the two 
legal tools. Secondly, I collapsed the sample at the firm level. I did an OLS regression 
using as dependent variable the average value of inventions produced by a firm (through 
OLS). These actions were performed using STATA v.12 software. 
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Results 
 
Before presenting the regressions I provide some descriptive statistics and the 
correlation matrix of the variables used.  
Table 2. Descriptive Statisitcs 
Variables Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Invention value 659.945 9,6858 16,4313 0,0000 1.555 
TS 659.945 0,4294 0,4950 0,0000 1 
CNC 659.945 3,4937 2,0463 0,0000 9 
R&D Expenditure 659.945 1034,8020 1543,2490 0,0000 12.183 
Number of Employees 659.945 99,2166 144,2013 0,0000 1.700 
 
As we can observe in Table 3, it is visible a similar effect that Png (2011) discovered 
which is the negative impact of UTSA enactment in forward citations, even if we cannot 
really infer anything from a mere bivariate correlation  
Table 3. Correlation Matrix 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 
1 Invention value 1,0000 
    
2 TS -0,0676 1,0000 
   
3 CNC 0,0220 -0,3124 1,0000 
  
4 R&D Expenditure -0,0368 -0,0212 -0,0558 1,0000 
 
5 Number of Employees 0,0355 -0,2023 0,0817 0,6022 1,0000 
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Also worth mentioning is the high correlation between the control variables which 
enhances the chances of multicollinearity problems. Though, with such a large pool 
observations this chance is quite limited. 
Results in Table 4 enlighten the relationship of TS with CNC. Column (1) depicts the 
first regression regarding the overall period of analysis, 1976-2006. Our main focus of 
analysis is the interaction variable which in this regression shows a significant positive 
coefficient of 0,0325 (±0,0137). This means that at the average of CNC enforceability 
(3,49~3) the interaction effect of the enactment of the UTSA on the invention value 
(number of forward citations) is around 11,2%; and a change in 1 point of the 
enforceability of CNC of a given state which has the UTSA enacted has an interaction 
effect of approximately 3,25% on the invention value. These results confirm our initial 
expectation of the complementary relationship between these two legal tools since both 
affect positively each other. 
Table 4. Invention Value Regressions  
 (1) 
Overall Period 
(2) 
Variance Overall Period 
(3) 
>1990 
 
VARIABLES Invention Value Invention Value Variance Invention Value  
TS 
-0.0461 0.0108 0.0164  
(0.0420) (0.0352) (0.0542)  
CNC 
0.0258 -0.0678*** -0.00441  
(0.0193) (0.0206) (0.0200)  
TSxCNC 
0.0325** 0.0217*** 0.0506***  
(0.0137) (0.00793) (0.0126)  
Log(R&D 
Expenditure) 
-0.000604 -0.0181 -0.0647  
(0.0410) (0.0313) (0.0582)  
Log(employees) 
-0.110** -0.0706** -0.0855  
(0.0414) (0.0280) (0.0732)  
Constant 
2.497*** 1.583*** 3.001***  
(0.234) (0.110) (0.378)  
Year Dummy Y Y Y  
State Dummy Y Y Y  
Observations 659,945 659,945 441,869  
R-squared 0.315 0.035 0.377  
Number of 
firms 
4,294 4,294 3,233  
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1 
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It was also performed a regression regarding the residuals of the first regression 
similarly to Fleming and Sorenson (2004). The purpose of this regression is to assess 
the impact of the usage of both legal tools on the invention value variance, which can be 
interpreted as R&D riskiness. We can observe that interaction effect is also significant 
and positive which means that the complementary protection increases the variance of e 
invention value. To be precise, the interaction effect causes an increase of 2,17% 
(±0,00793) in the variance of the invention value. 
In other words, when firms are protected by both trade secrecy and covenants not to 
compete they undertake riskier R&D projects whose outcome is more unpredictable. 
Though, if you view these results in addition to the previously stated, you can conclude 
the effects of TS and CNC’s are complementary since, the usage of both, incentives 
firms to pursue riskier projects but with also more value. 
 
Robustness Checks 
 
In a large sample size, the differences-in-differences analysis may raise some questions 
since even small effects could show up as statistically significant. In order to address 
this problem, I replicated the analysis two times using different criteria to confirm my 
results. 
Firstly, I replicated the analysis using a shorter period of analysis: 1990-2006 (Table 4. 
Column (3)).The reasons for this choice are basically because it reduces the number of 
observations and because it limits the period of analysis to be the same of Garmaise 
(2009).The findings were the same as the previous analysis. The interaction variable 
presented a positive and significant impact on the invention value, thus confirming the 
complementarity of TS and CNC. 
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Table 5. Firm level Regressions 
 Xtreg 
VARIABLES Invention Value 
TS -0.205 
 (-1.058) 
CNC -0.147 
 (0.499) 
TSxCNC 0.536* 
 (0.288) 
R&D Expenditure -0.000437 
 (0.000881) 
Employees -0.0137*** 
 (0.00501) 
Constant 15.50*** 
Year Dummy Y 
State Dummy N 
 -1.803 
Observations 26,217 
R-squared 0.180 
Number of gvkey 4,153 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
 
Secondly, I collapsed the data at the firm and year level and replicated the analysis 
(Table 5. Column (1)). The regression reported the same results as the previous, with a 
significant and positive impact of the interaction on the invention value. On the other 
hand, the reduction in the sample caused a loss in the significance from p<0,001 to 
p>0,1 but the overall model continued to have a great adherence with the F-Test 
reporting a p<0,001. 
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Discussion &Conclusions 
 
This study shows that trade secrecy and covenants not to compete jointly increase the 
expected value of inventions. Furthermore, the use of both legal tools also has a positive 
impact on the risk taking in R&D. Hence it is possible to say that covenants not to 
compete, together with trade secrecy, jointly lead firms to invest in riskier but also more 
valuable R&D projects. 
The findings of this study are interesting for both policy makers and managerial 
practices. Both policy makers and managers should not focus on only one of these types 
of protection. Using both tools provide in fact firms with the protection necessary to 
invest in more risky but potentially more valuable innovations. 
In this respect, similar to Conti (forthcoming), my results  indicate that the enforcement 
and application of both legal tools could result in an increase of intrapreneurship since it 
provides companies “safe” grounds to pursue riskier R&D paths. 
A limitation of this study regards the dependent variable, as I did not exclude self-
citations. The inclusion of self-citations might reduce its part as invention value 
indicator since it is believed that they are an indicator of a patent unfitness to market 
(Sorenson, Stuart 2001). Another limitation regards the trade secrecy as independent 
variable. The Png (2011) chronology is a mere measure of state enactment though the 
UTSA (Samuel and Johnson 1990). However, this act could be enforced differently by 
different states, based on the common law principles. The Bureau of National Affairs 
has published a similar survey of Malsbergeret. al (2008) that could account for both 
statute and common law. It was not easy to codify though.  
An underlying assumption of this study is that companies regarded in the sample indeed 
use trade secrecy and covenants not to compete to appropriate innovation. Then again, 
we can assume this is true. Almeling et al. (2010), Kaplan and Stromberg (2003) and 
Cohen et al. (2000) provide in fact strong evidence that companies use both trade 
secrecy and covenants not to compete, whenever possible. 
Many interesting paths could be taken to complement this study and reinforce its 
findings. One interesting path would be to replicate the same study but with the 
inclusion of private companies. Private companies differ in their management 
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comparing to public companies being more often more daring and secretive. Indeed the 
ownership structure of a company might have directly influence its risk taking (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976; May, 1995). By using both private and public companies the study 
could provide with a better understanding of the effect of trade secrecy and covenants 
not to compete interaction. I would expect that my results would be reinforced since 
private companies, due to lack of size, lack the complementary assets to exploit their 
inventions thus needing legal tools to appropriate returns (Cohen et. al 2000). 
Another path for future research would be to focus on the joint effect of CNC and TS on 
entrepreneurship, analyzing whether they foster or inhibit both the creation and the 
survival of new firms. I believe this analysis would contribute greatly to the 
understanding the critical factors that enabled California’s Silicon Valley surpassing of 
Massachusetts Route 128 that has been much debated by scholars (Gilson, 1999; Hyde, 
2003).  
  
19 
 
References 
 
Acharya, Viral V., Ramin P. Baghai, and Krishnamurthy V. Subramanian, \Wrongful 
Dis-charge Laws and Innovation", Working Paper 1570663, SSRN, March 14, 2010. 
 
Agarwal R., Ganco M., Ziedonis RM. 2009. Reputations for toughness in patent 
enforcement: implications for knowledge spillover via inventor mobility. Strategic 
Management Journal 30: 1349-1374. 
 
Albert MB, Avery D, Narin F, McAllister P. 1991. Direct validation of citation counts 
as indicators of industrially important patents. Research Policy 20: 251-259. 
 
Almeida P., Kogut B. 1999. Localization of Knowledge and the Mobility of Engineers 
in Regional Networks.Management Science Vol. 45, No 7. 
 
Almeida P., Dokko G., Rosenkopf L. 2003. Startup size and the mechanisms of external 
learning: increasing opportunity and decreasing ability?. Research Policy: 301-315. 
 
Almeling, David S., Darin W. Snyder, Michael Sapoznikow, Whitney E. McCollum, 
and Jill Weader, 2010.A Statistical Analysis of Trade Secret Litigation in Federal 
Courts, Gonzaga Law Review, Vol. 45 No. 2. 
 
Arundel A. 2001. The relative effectiveness of patents and secrecy for 
appropriation.ResearchPolicy Vol. 30: 611-624. 
 
Arundel A., KablaI. 1998. What percentage of innovations are patented? Empirical 
estimates for European firms. Research Policy Vol. 27: 127-141. 
 
Bertrand M, Duflo E, Mullainathan S. 2004. How much should we trust differences-in-
differences estimates? Quarterly Journal of Economics 119(1): 249-275. 
 
Bessen J. 2009. Matching Patent Data to Compustat Firms, www.nber.org/ 
~jbessen/matchdoc.pdf 
 
Bone RG. 1998. A new look at trade secret law: Doctrine in Search of Justification. 
California Law ReviewVol. 86 No. 2: 241-314. 
 
Cava A. 1990. Trade Secrets and Covenants not to compete: Beware of Winning the 
Battle but Losing the War. Journal of Small Business Management: October 1990 
 
Ceccagnoli M., 2008. Appropriability, Preemption and Firm Performance. Strategic 
Management Journal 29: 0081-0098 
 
Cohen MD, Nelson RR, Walsh JP. 2000. Protecting their intellectual assets: 
appropriability conditions and why U.S. manufacturing firms patent (or not). NBER 
working paper 7552, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA. 
Available at: http://www.nber.org/papers/w7552. 
 
  
20 
 
Conti R. forthcoming Do non-competition agreements lead firms to pursue path-
breaking inventions? Strategic Management Journal. 
 
Fisk CL. 2001Working Knowledge: Trade Secrets, Restrictive Covenants in 
Employment and the Rise of Corporate Intellectual Property. Harvard Law Journal 
Vol.52: 442-534 
Fleming L., Sorenson O. 2004. Science as Map of Technological Search. Strategic 
Management Journal 25: 909-928. 
Franco A, Mitchell MF. 2008. Covenants not to compete, labor mobility, and industry 
dynamics. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 17 (3): 581-606. 
Garmaise M. 2011. Ties that truly blind: non-competition agreements, executive 
compensation and firm investment. Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 27(2): 
376-425. 
Gilson R.J. 1999. The legal infrastructure of high technology industrial districts: Silicon 
Valley, Route 128, and covenants not to compete. New York University Law Review 
74: 575-629. 
Graves CT., Diboise JA. 2006. Do Strict and Non-Competition Laws Obstruct 
innovation? Entrepreneurial Business Law Jornal Vol1:2: 324-344. 
Holley R. 1998. Looking at the legalities of non-compete agreements. Computer 
Reseller News 80, 139. 
Hall BH, Jaffe AB, Trajtenberg M. 2001, The NBER patent citations data file: lessons, 
insights and methodological tools. NBER working paper 8498. 
Harhoff D, Narin F, Scherer FM, Vopel K. 1999. Citation frequency and the value of 
patented inventions. Review of Economics and Statistics 81(3): 511-515 
Hyde A. 2003. Working in Silicon Valley: Economic and Legal Analysis of a High-
Velocity Labor.Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe. 
Kaplan SN, Stromberg P. 2003. Financial contracting theory meets the real world: an 
empirical analysis of venture capital contracts. Review of Economic Studies 70: 281-
315. 
Lerner J. 2006Using Litigation to Understand Trade Secrets: A Preliminary 
Exploration. Working Paper 922520, SSRN, 
Levin RC, Klevorick AK, Nelson RR, Winter SG, Gilbert R, Griliches Z. 1987. 
Appropriating the returns from industrial research and development; comments and 
discussion. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 3: 783-831. 
Lydon J.C. 1987. The Deterrent Effect of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act.Journal of 
Patent & Trademark Office Society Vol.69: 427-444. 
  
21 
 
Malsberger B. 2004, Covenants Not to Compete: A State-by-State Survey. BNA Books: 
Washington D.C. 
Marx M, Singh J, Fleming L. 2011. Regional disadvantage? Non-competes and brain drain. 
INSEAD working paper. 
 
Marx M, Strumsky D, Fleming L. 2009. Mobility, skills, and the Michigan non-compete 
experiment. Management Science 55: 875-889. 
Motta M., Ronde T. 2002. Trade Secret Laws, labor mobility, and innovations.CEPR 
Discussion Paper No. 3615  
Png2011. Law and Innovation: Evidence from the Uniform Trade Secrets Act. Working 
Paper, University of Singapore 
Png 2012. Trade Secrets, Non-Competes, and Inventor Mobility: Empirical Evidence. 
Working Paper, University of Singapore 
Samila S., Sorenson O. 2011. Non Compete Covenants: Incentives to Innovate or 
Impediments to Growth. Management Science Vol.57 No.3: 425-438. 
Samuels L., Johnson B. 1991. The Uniform Trade Secrets Act: The State’s Response. 
Creighton Law Review Vol.24: 49-98. 
Saxenian A. 1994, Regional Advantage: Culture and Competition in Silicon Valley and 
Route 128. Harvard University Press: Cambridge, MA.  
Shaver JM, Flyer F. 2000. Agglomeration economies, firm heterogeneity, and foreign 
direct investment in the United States, Strategic Management Journal 21(12): 
1175:1193. 
Snowdon B., Vane H., Modern Macroeconomics Its Origins, Development and Current 
State, Edward Elgar, Northampton, MA 626-632 
Thompson P. 2005. Patent citations and the geography of knowledge spillovers: a 
reassessment. American Economic Review 95(1): 450-460 
Trajtenberg M. 1990. A penny for your quotes: patent citations and the value of 
innovations. RAND Journal of Economics 21: 172-187. 
Zack, M.H. (1999), “Managing Codified Knowledge”. Sloan Management Review, 40 
(4): 45-58 
  
  
22 
 
Appendix 
 
Appendix 1.Questions and Thresholds to assess non-Competes Enforceability  
The list of questions and thresholds is taken by Garmaise (2009). Each state is granted 
onepoint for each question concerning which its laws lie above the threshold.  
Question 1.Is there a state statute of general application that governs the enforceability 
of covenants not to compete?  
Threshold 1.States with statutes that enforce non-competition  agreements outside a 
sale-of-business context receive a score of one.  
Question 2. What is an employer's protectable interest and how is it defined?  
Threshold 2.States in which the employer can prevent the employee from future 
independent dealings with all the firm's customers,notmerely with the customers with 
whom the employee had direct contact, receive a score of one.  
Question 3.What must the plaintiff be able to show to prove the existence of an 
enforceable covenant not to compete?  
Threshold 3.Laws that place greater weight on the interests ofthe firm relative to those 
of the former employee are above the threshold. For example, a law that requires that 
the contract be reasonably protective of the firm's business interests and only meet the 
condition of not being unreasonably injurious to the employee's interests would receive 
ascore of one.  
Question 4.Does the signing of a covenant not to compete at the inception of the 
employment relationship provide sufficient consideration to support the covenant?  
Threshold 4.  States for which the answer to Question 4 is clearly "Yes" are above the 
threshold.  
Question 5.  Will a change in the terms and conditions of employment provide 
sufficientconsideration to support a covenant not to compete entered into after the 
employment relationship has begun? Threshold 5.  States for which the answer to 
Question 5 is clearly "Yes" are above the threshold.  
Question 6.  Will continued employment provide sufficient consideration to support a 
covenant not to compete entered into after the employment relationship has begun?  
Threshold 6.States for which the answer to Question 6 is clearly "Yes" are above the 
threshold.  
Question 7.  What factors will the court consider in determining whether time and   
geographic restrictions in the covenant are reasonable? 
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Threshold 7.Jurisdictions in which courts are instructed not to consider economic or 
other hardships faced by the employee are above the threshold.  
Question 8.Who has the burden of proving the reasonableness or unreasonableness of 
the covenant not to compete?  
Threshold8. States in which the burden of proof is clearly placed on the employee are 
above the threshold.  
Question 9.What type of time or geographic restrictions has the court found to be 
reasonable? Unreasonable? 
Threshold 9.Jurisdictions in which three-year statewide restrictions have been upheld 
receive a score of one.  
Question 10.  If the restrictions in the covenant not to compete  are unenforceable 
becausethey are overbroad, are the courts permitted to modify the covenant to make 
therestrictions more narrow and to make the covenants enforceable?  
Threshold 10. States for which the answer to Question 10 is clearly "Yes" are above the 
threshold.  
Question 11.If the employer terminates the employment relationship, is the covenant 
enforceable?  
Threshold 11. States for which the answer to Question 11 is clearly "Yes" are above the 
threshold.  
Question 12.What damages may an employer recover and from whom for breach of a 
covenant not to compete?  
Threshold 12.If, in addition to lost profits, there is a potential for punitive damages 
against the former employee, the state receives a score of one. States that explicitly 
exclude consideration of the reasonableness of the contractfrom the calculation of 
damages are also above the threshold. 
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Appendix 2.Garmaise Non-compete Enforceability Index 
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Appendix 3.Png UTSA enactment Chronology 
 
 
 
